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Abstract: 
Concepts of terrorism, political turmoil, and war appear unrelated to tourism. Closer examination of their points 
of convergence and impacts on tourism reveals otherwise. This paper examines literature focusing on the 
relationships between these phenomena. Research themes which emerge from available studies include impacts 
of terrorism and political instability on tourist demand, motives of terrorists in targeting tourists, using tourism 
as a political tool, the effects of political violence on destination image, crisis management, and recovery 
marketing efforts. The intent of this article is to synthesize research on these relationships, to present a 
comprehensive index of relevant publications, and to suggest topics for future research.  
Keywords: terrorism, political instability, war, international tourism, destination image, crisis management, 
recovery marketing.  
 
Résumé: Tourisme, terrorisme et instabilité politique. A premiere vue le terrorisme, l'instabilité politique et la 
guerre ne semblent pas être liés au tourisme. Mais une examination plus approfondie de leurs points de 
convergence et de leurs impacts sur l'industrie du tourisme indique autrement. Cet article examine las littérature 
sur les relations entre ces phénomenes. Les themes des études precedentes incluent les impacts du terrorisme et 
de l'instabilite politique sur la demande touristique, les motivations des terroristes prenant pour cible des 
touristes, l'utilisation du tourisme comme outil politique, les effets des violences politiques sur l'image des 
destinations, la gerance des crises et les efforts de promation suite aux incidents. L'article presente aussi un 
index exhaustif des publications importantes et suggere des sujets de recherche future.  
Mots-clés: terrorisme, instabilite politique, guerre, tourisme international, image des destinations, gerance de 
crises, promotion.  
 
Article: 
INTRODUCTION 
Even its demonstrated economic success does not shield international tourism from the sinister power of 
terrorism. While numerous natural and human-caused disasters can significantly impact the flow of tourism, the 
threat of danger that accompanies terrorism or political turmoil tends to intimidate potential tourists more 
severely. Fear of random terrorist violence is not new, but the attention it has commanded from scholars can be 
traced back only a decade. As international terrorism peaked during the mid-80s, its inevitable effects on 
tourism became the object of serious concern. More recently, the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the possibility of 
related global terrorism refocused attention on the topic. This continues to intensify as a result of terrorist 
incidents and political turmoil which make headlines around the world. A parallel can be drawn between 
the escalation of volatile political situations that threaten tourists and the proliferation of published works on the 
topic; the volume of scholarly attention focusing on this subject has begun to approach its significance. 
 
Issues of tourist safety and risk are as engrossing as they are weighty. A literature search fueled by an interest in 
the relationship between tourism, terrorism and political conflict also yields studies on the topics of war and 
crime. The question remains, however, whether all of these works shed sufficient light on the current under-
standing of how international tourism can be protected from terrorism or political conflict. The terrorism and 
tourism literature has several foci: terrorists' motives for targeting tourists or the industry; impacts of terrorism 
on tourism demand; and possible solutions for tourists to help minimize their risks. Studies examining the 
effects of political unrest or war on the industry focus on specific situations such as the Philippines, Fiji, 
Zimbabwe, Zambia, Tibet, China, Mexico, and Yugoslavia. These works are valuable as case studies that 
provide readers with the opportunity to analyze situations and deliberate on successful and unsuccessful 
management efforts of the governments involved. Several of these cases are examined from different 
perspectives and can be organized into broader discussions of tourism as a political tool; the effects of political 
turmoil on tourism; and recovery marketing efforts. Because each case is highly unique, however, it is difficult 
to outline common strategies. 
 
Well publicized examples of terrorism or political conflict involving the tourism industry are frequently referred 
to by the studies which—although useful in chronicling the relationship offer few solutions. Important questions 
remain: how do destinations burdened with political challenges deal with negative images? How does the 
industry manage the crisis of terrorism or political strife? How can it become immune to the effects of terrorism 
and political problems? Thus, this paper attempts to synthesize what is known about the relationships between 
terrorism, political instability and tourism; to present a comprehensive index of publications on the topic for 
future studies; and to stress the need to better understand this dangerous relationship by suggesting topics for 
additional research. 
 
TERRORISM AND POLITICAL TURMOIL 
The US Department of State defines terrorism as " ... pre-meditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated 
against civilians and unarmed military personnel by subnational groups ... usually intended to influence an 
audience"; and international terrorism as " ... involving citizens or the territory of more than one country" 
(1996:4). As a form of political expression, terrorism dates back to 6 A.D. when Jewish patriots opposed to 
Roman rule in Palestine, organized under the name of Zealots and launched a terrorist campaign to drive 
Romans out of Palestine (Poland 1988; Schlagheck 1988). Terrorism recurred from 116-117 A.D. and again 
from 132-135 A.D. until the Jewish population was driven out of Rome. The term did not officially enter 
political vocabulary until the 18th century, when Edmund Burke criticized the "reign of terror" following the 
1792-94 French Revolution, when the French government used systematic terror to intimidate and eliminate its 
enemies (Murphy 1989; Poland 1988; Schlagheck 1988). On and off, the use of terrorism can be traced to 
present day. International terrorism increased rapidly during the late 60s and early 70s; after a brief lull in 
activity, the 80s began and ended with terrorist violence. By the end of the decade, terrorism had become 
commonplace (D'Amore and Anuza 1986; Richter and Waugh 1986). Comparatively fewer terrorist incidents 
have been recorded for the first half of the 90s; however, their nature and magnitude are not easily comparable 
to those of past years' events as indicated by the US Department of State, 
 
Yet, while the incidence of international terrorism has dropped sharply in the last decade, the overall 
threat of terrorism remains very serious ... the threat of terrorist use of materials of mass destruction is 
an issue of growing concern ... (1997:1). 
 
Nevertheless, one of the highest recent death tolls, resulting from international terrorist attacks, was recorded in 
1996: 311 people compared with 163 in 1995 (US Department of State 1997). The mercurial nature of terrorism 
is illustrated by a quote from Patterns of Global Terrorism, an annual US State Department publication 
containing information on terrorist organizations and statistics: 
 
In most countries, the level of international terrorism in 1995 continued the downward trend of recent 
years, and there were fewer terrorist acts that caused deaths last year than in the previous year. However, 
the total number of international terrorist acts rose in 1995 from 322 to 440 ...international terrorist 
attacks against US interests rose to 99 in 1995 from 66 in 1994, and the number of US citizens killed 
rose from four to 12. The total number of fatalities from international terrorism worldwide declined from 
314 in 1994 to 165 in 1995, but the number of persons wounded increased by a factor of ten to 6,291 
persons; 5,500 were injured in a gas attack in the Tokyo subway system in March (1996:5). 
 
Closer scrutiny of terrorism—for the purpose of understanding some of its underlying currents—begs a look at 
world conditions. As a new millennium is about to begin, nations wrestle with hunger, disease, and numerous 
other socioeconomic and environmental problems, which are further exacerbated by the alarming growth in the 
world's population rate, the combination of which may nurture terrorism. It is suggested that terrorist 
organizations can easily recruit members by offering better conditions to people living in undesirable 
circumstances in undeveloped nations (D'Amore and Anuza 1986). 
 
A plethora of definitions, typologies, and theories have been developed in the earnest effort to understand and 
explain terrorism; as a result, an integrative theory is difficult to find. Fortunately, one lucid explanation 
shadows the many others. Terrorism, "as a symbolic act", according to Karber, "can be analyzed much like 
other mediums of communication," (1971:9). This conceptualization is accompanied by four basic components 
of the communication process within the context of terrorism: transmitter of message (terrorist); intended 
recipient of message (target of terrorist's message); message (terrorist act involving individual or institutional 
victims); and feedback (reaction of the recipient). Karber's explanation supports a familiar scenario: terrorists 
initiate communication when they hijack a passenger airline; the target of their message is likely to be a large 
and usually removed audience (i.e., the government being protested); travelers on the plane and the hijacking 
itself represent the message (which may involve certain demands); and governmental compliance with terrorist 
demands represent the feedback required by the terrorists to confirm successful communication. Karber's (1971) 
description of terrorism is realistic in the light of the terrorist incidents the world has witnessed over the past 
two decades. Aided by mass media, terrorists are able to successfully communicate their plight and their 
objectives to large audiences they would otherwise never access. 
 
Predictions of the future of terrorism are provided by diverse sources who echo each other in forecasting that 
terrorist organizations will demonstrate more frequent and bolder action (D'Amore and Anuza 1986; Jenkins 
1987, 1988; US Department of State 1996). Experts speculate that terrorists will continue to select vulnerable 
("soft") targets, that their attacks will become more indiscriminate, that terrorism will become institutionalized 
and spread geographically as a method of armed conflict, and that the public will witness more terrorism than 
ever before due to the media's improved ability to cover terrorist incidents (Atkinson, Sandler and Tschirhart 
1987; Jenkins 1988). According to Jenkins (1988) extraordinary security measures will become a permanent 
and accepted way of life just as terrorism will become routine and "almost tolerable". A recent string of terrorist 
attacks, many in the United States (i.e., 1993 World Trade Center bombing, 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, 
1996 bombing of US base in Saudi Arabia, 1996 bomb explosion at Atlanta's Centennial Olympic Park, 1996 
discovery and detonation of pipe bomb on tarmac of Chicago's O'Hare International Airport has indeed caused 
tightened security measures confirming the first part of Jenkins's prediction. 
 
In discussions of the future of terrorism, several trends were identified at the 10th Annual Symposium on 
Criminal Justice Issues held in 1995: 
 
1. Marxist/Leninist terrorist motives of the 70s and 80s have been largely replaced by Islamic 
fundamentalism. 2. Terrorist states providing essential weapons, supplies, financing, coordination, 
training, and safe haven to sustain terrorism have changed from Moscow, Havana, Sofia, and East Berlin 
(in the 80s) to Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria (in the 90s). 3. Unraveling connections 
between terrorists and their groups has become more difficult due to increased cooperation among major 
terrorist groups and changes in their organizational nature from structured to fluid. 4. Increasing 
possibility of terrorists employing weapons of mass destruction (i.e., biological, chemical, nuclear). As 
the first recorded occurrence of terrorists committing mass-murder with such a weapon, the 1995 "sarin" 
gas attack in Japan—which killed 12 persons and injured 5,500 rush-hour commuters—introduced the 
world to this disturbing reality of terrorism (Ranstorp 1996; US Department of State 1996). 
 
In retaliation, nations around the world have begun to join forces in counter-terrorism activities, law 
enforcement, and intelligence gathering. Various multilateral conferences and summit meetings have been 
organized in an effort to devise strategies to fight terrorism. In 1995, officials from Chile, Brazil, Paraguay, 
Uruguay, and the United States, attended a regional ministerial meeting in Argentina to discuss measures 
against terrorist threat in the region (US Department of State 1996). In response to mandates set by the Halifax 
Summit held in June 1995, a counter-terrorism conference was held in December in Ottawa and was attended 
by heads of state from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States (e.g., 
Group of Seven, G-7), and Russia. Six international counter-terrorist meetings were held in 1996: the "Summit 
of Peacemakers" in Egypt cohosted by President Clinton and President Mubarak; Asia and Pacific conferences 
on terrorism hosted by the Philippines and Japan; the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Terrorism in 
Lima, hosted by Peru; and the meeting in Paris of the ministers of the G-7 and Russia. 
 
In the United States, President Clinton signed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act into law in 
1996, thereby increasing the federal government's powers to fight terrorism. The Clinton administration is also 
negotiating new extradition treaties with other nations and blocking assets of terrorists and their groups in this 
country. The strict US counter terrorist policy "stresses three general rules: make no deals with terrorists and do 
not submit to blackmail; treat terrorists as criminals, pursue them aggressively, and apply the rule of law; and 
apply maximum pressure on states that sponsor and support terrorists by imposing economic, diplomatic, and 
political sanctions and by urging other states to do likewise" (US Department of State 1997:2). Repeated 
terrorist incidents during the summer of 1996 and growing attention to terrorism by the US government serve as 
sobering testimony to terror's prominent place on US political and security agendas. 
 
Political instability describes the condition of a country where a government "has been toppled, or is controlled 
by factions following a coup, or where basic functional pre-requisites for social-order control and maintenance 
are unstable and periodically disrupted" (Cook 1990:14). Current or present examples of highly publicized 
political conflicts include the 1991 disintegration of Yugoslavia and the ensuing war in Bosnia-Herzegovina; 
racial, ethnic, religious conflicts in Burundi, Haiti, India, Pakistan, Rwanda, Somalia and South Africa; student 
uprisings in China and North Korea; and the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East. This suggests that 
countries around the world facing some form of political conflict outweigh those that enjoy peace and stability. 
 
Terrorism and political instability are not unrelated (Hall and O'Sullivan 1996; Lea 1996; Wieviorka 1994). 
Wieviorka (1994) uses Lebanon, Italy, and former West Germany as examples of how political crises can 
eventually erupt in terrorism. Aside from terrorism, international, regional and civil wars, ethnic cleansing, 
declarations of martial law, military coups and riots can often be traced to political unrest, threatening both the 
safety of specific countries and of entire regions, such as Middle East, Balkans, and East Africa (Hall and 
O'Sullivan 1996; Wieviorka 1994). The strong link between political instability and terrorism may explain the 
difficulty in separating the two in some of the literature. Several articles take the reader back and forth into 
discussions of terrorism and political turmoil until the reader is unsure of any fundamental differences in their 
impacts on tourism. Despite different characteristics, both political instability and terrorism impact tourism 
severely. Terrorism occurs quickly and briefly and assures immediate public attention through intense and 
dramatic media coverage. Political turmoil—even though it does not always command the same level of media 
scrutiny—has lingering effects and can effectively impede travel to affected areas and create an enduring barrier 
to international tourism; fortunately, issues of tourism within the context of political turmoil or war have been 
receiving increased attention (Gartner and Shen 1992; Hall 1994; Hollier 1991; Richter 1983; Schwartz 1991; 
Scott 1988; Teye 1986, 1988). In particular, readers interested in understanding relationships between tourism 
and politics are referred to Tourism and Politics: Policy, Power and Place (Hall 1994), a synthesis of studies on 
the subject. Other recent contributions to the existing body of knowledge include Tourism, Crime and 
International Security Issues (edited by Pizam and Mansfeld 1996) and proceedings of the "Talk at the Top 
International Conference on Tourism Security and Risk", organized in 1995 by Mid Sweden University. The 
former is a book divided into four sections distinguished as: tourism and crime; tourism and political instability; 
tourism and war; and crime and the hotel industry. The latter is a compilation of papers presented at the first 
conference of its kind focusing on issues of tourist safety and risks, crime, terrorism, and hospitality crisis 
management. 
 
Paradoxically, international terrorism and tourism share certain characteristics. They both cross national 
borders, involve citizens of different countries, and utilize travel and communications technologies (Schlagheck 
1988). Their relationship has become the topic of numerous news reports over the years. Random terrorist 
activities intimidate tourists and curtail or realign tourism flows until the public's memories of the publicized 
incidents fade. For some countries, however, persistent terrorism tarnishes the destination's positive image and 
even jeopardizes its entire tourism business. Tourism suffers when prolonged terrorist attacks affect tourist 
perceptions and when terrorist organizations specifically target the industry. Examples of countries where 
terrorism or political problems and tourism have intersected, resulting in either the hindrance of tourist activity 
or modification of tourist type or role are discussed in Table 1. These examples validate Wahab's (1995) claim 
that terrorism absorbs each society's characteristics. Countries may face different circumstances but their 
tourism industries share similar challenges—some more drastic than others. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Terrorism—Tourism Relationship 
It is logical to believe that understanding terrorist goals may help untangle the relationship between terrorism 
and tourism. Not all may agree on terrorists' motives, but several studies attempt to explain the nature of the 
terrorism—tourism relationship. It is evident from the literature that targeting tourists or the industry is quite 
deliberate and helps terrorists achieve several goals (i.e., publicity, economic disruption, ideological opposition 
to tourism). In one of the earliest articles on the topic, Richter (1983) illustrates the symbolic nature of the 
terrorism—tourism relationship by drawing parallels between peaceful international tourism and diplomatic 
relations. She suggests that tourists are targeted because they are viewed as ambassadors for their countries, as 
soft targets, and often because of their "symbolic value as indirect representatives of hostile or unsympathetic 
governments" (Richter 1983; Richter and Waugh 1986:235). This concept was fatally demonstrated during the 
1985 hijacking of the Achille Lauro yacht by Palestinian terrorists. The selection of the only Jewish American 
on board as the one passenger to be killed is anything but coincidental. Over the years, terrorist recognition of 
the political significance of international tourism has been repeatedly and tragically communicated. According 
to Richter, terrorism involving citizens of other countries may be a response to strict limits on political 
expression: "terrorism against one's own citizens may in fact go unmentioned by a media controlled by the 
hostile government" (1983:328). The reason is simple and obvious and has been demonstrated by numerous 
incidents: when nationals of other countries become involved, news coverage is guaranteed. This way, terrorists 
know they will secure media attention while curtailing their government's ability to censor news content. When 
tourists are kidnapped or killed, the situation is instantaneously dramatized by the media, which also helps the 
political conflict between terrorists and the establishment reach a global scale. Terrorists achieve the exposure 
they crave (Richter 1983) and the media increases its circulation and/or ratings. 
 
Terrorists' goals are classified broadly as revolutionary (narrow or broad, antigovernment, including overthrow 
of the regime) or subrevolutionary (including policy and personnel changes). More specifically, objectives are 
classified as ideological, strategic, and tactical (Richter and Waugh 1986). Ideological objectives are long-range 
in nature and may involve a national struggle. Tactical objectives, which are short-range and motivated by 
legitimized concerns, often involve robberies and choice of targets from affluent tourism locations, tourists 
themselves who are vulnerable to attack, and resort areas at which socioeconomic and political elites reside—
strongly resembling everyday criminal activity. Richter and Waugh suggest that terrorists target tourists to 
achieve strategic objectives and that attacking them can provide terrorists with instrumental advantage by 
disrupting the industry and assuring publicity. Terrorists gravitate toward inter-national tourists and facilities to 
satisfy their own resource needs. Large groups of foreign-speaking and -looking tourists provide camouflage 
and safety while offering various opportunities and choice of targets. Terrorists can circulate among tourists and 
carry out financial transactions in foreign currencies without arousing suspicion (Richter and Waugh 1986). 
Viewed differently, terrorists target tourists in order to achieve ideological objectives, punish nationals for 
supporting the government, and strengthen claims to political legitimacy by making the government look weak 
(Hall and O'Sullivan 1996). 
 
Even though authors describe terrorism objectives differently, they agree that terrorists have much to gain by 
targeting tourists. When tourism symbolizes capitalism and, if it is state-sponsored, then the attack on the 
industry is an attack on the government as well. Because this trade represents a significant economic activity, 
terrorist attacks on tourists cause foreign exchange receipts to decline, thereby allowing terrorists to impose 
indirect costs on the government and to gain political advantage over the officials (Hall and O'Sullivan 1996; 
Richter and Waugh 1986). According to Edgell (1990), tourist decisions to stay home or choose "safer" 
destinations are translated into significant losses for the industry of the country suffering from terrorism. 
Egypt's 43% drop in tourism receipts as a result of terrorist attacks, which began in 1992, is sobering proof of 
how terrorists can damage a country's economy (Wahab 1996). 
 
Several studies offer logical socioeconomic and cultural explanations of the terrorism–tourism relationship 
(Aziz 1995; Lea 1996; Richter 1983; Wahab 1995, 1996). According to Richter, tourism can "spawn divisive 
conflicts among proponents and opponents of tourism development" (1983:18-19). She further points out, 
foreign business travelers and tourism facilities might become "legitimate" targets for terrorists who oppose the 
control socioeconomic and political elites exert over the industry. The perception that tourism development 
does not really benefit locals can provoke violence when it is blamed for "exploiting and destroying indigenous 
industries and cultures ... " (Richter and Waugh 1986:237). Lea's statement that "a failure on the part of tourist 
[developers] to design, locate, and manage their projects in a way that ensures community support will 
ultimately lead to community opposition and likely violence" (1996:124) supports this proposition. It is possible 
that local frustration with the tourism industry can ultimately lead to opposition followed by violent action (Lea 
1996). 
 
In his discussion of terrorism in Egypt, Aziz (1995) counters the misconception that Islam is simply against 
foreign tourists with a socioeconomic explanation. According to Aziz, tourists and locals in Egypt are separated 
by language barriers as well as economic and social gaps. When poverty stricken locals are forced to co-exist 
with international tourists enjoying luxuries, friction is inevitable. Aziz's explanation supports Richter's (1983) 
earlier suggestion that travel styles can be representative of ideological values, class behavior, and political 
culture of tourists and their countries. As a result, tourists may be targeted because of their tourism styles which 
may demonstrate conspicuous consumption (i.e., demonstration of money or credit cards; flashy photography 
equipment; expensive clothes, jewelry, and luggage). Resentments which build against tourism can thus ignite 
into dangerous expressions of bitterness. 
 
Friction between host and guest can also result from clashing cultures or values. Certain tourist behaviors (i.e., 
consumption of pork and alcohol; gambling; Western dress; codes of behavior incongruent with Islamic 
tradition)—incongruent with Islamic cultural values—are also suggested as a possible explanation for the 
Egyptians' frustration (Aziz 1995). Wahab concurs by suggesting that sometimes terrorism specifically targets 
tourism because it is seen as a movement of " 'alien' visitors representing a form of neo-colonialism or a threat 
to well-established societal norms, traditions, value-systems, and religious convictions" (1995:85). Wahab's 
explanation that Egypt's terrorist attacks against tourists represent their desire to revive classic Islamic societal 
rules to resist the corruption of modernity (perceived as deviation from Islam) supports Richter and Waugh's 
earlier implication that discord could result when tourism is blamed for the " ... contamination of culture due to 
simple contact" (1986:237). More conservative locals or Muslim activists may feel they need to take drastic 
action to prevent what they perceive as a threat to their national culture, tradition, and religious beliefs (Wahab 
1995). Regrettably, in extreme cases, the desire to protect sacred beliefs manifests itself in terrorism. 
Simply put, the literature demonstrates that tourism can be the message as well as the medium of 
communication initiated by terrorists. Tourism can inspire terrorist violence by fueling political, religious, 
socioeconomic, or cultural resentment and be used as a cost effective instrument to deliver a broader message of 
ideological/political opposition. In either case, the choice of the tourist as target is not coincidental. For 
terrorists, the symbolism, high profile, and news value of international tourists are too valuable not to exploit. 
Diverging from other writers, Ryan (1993) treats terrorism as an advanced form of crime in a typology of 
crimes involving tourism. Admittedly, at first glance terrorism and crime are similar because they both involve 
random violence against individuals and threaten tourism. It is important, however, to differentiate between the 
two because the lack of a clear delineation of motives can only add to the difficulty of devising solutions. 
Terrorism clearly differs from everyday crime on the basis of political or religious motives. Undoubtedly, crime 
can impede tourism by wielding a significant blow to the fragile nature of a destination's safe image. The 
ramifications can be long-term and extremely difficult and expensive to recover from. Murders of foreign 
tourists in Miami have exemplified such challenges faced by a destination. Many studies discuss the 
relationship between crime and tourism (Bach 1996; Bloom 1996; Chesney-Lind and Lind 1986; Cohen 1996; 
Demos 1992; Hollinger 1995; Kemmer 1995; Lankford 1996; LeBruto 1996; Pizam 1982; Prideaux 1996; Ryan 
and Kinder 1996; Schiebler, Crotts and Hollinger 1996; Tarlow and Muehsam 1996). 
 
The statistics clearly demonstrate that risks alter tourism demand patterns. For example, over six million 
Americans visited Europe in 1985 and seven million more were projected to go in 1986; however, 54% of them 
canceled their reservations to Europe due to the peak in terrorist activity (D'Amore and Anuza 1986). According 
to a Gallup Poll conducted by Newsweek the same year, 79% of Americans said they would avoid overseas 
destinations that summer (D'Amore and Anuza 1986). The events of 1986 (which also included the Chernobyl 
nuclear disaster and the US military raid on Libya) significantly reduced visitation to Europe; travel to several 
European countries fell below projections—e.g., Greece by 30%; the United Kingdom by 68%; and former 
West Germany by 77% (Brady and Widdows 1988). Mediterranean countries recorded a 50% decline in 
bookings and Egypt alone recorded a 65% reduction in American visitors. The World Tourism Organization 
attributed the $105 billion in lost tourism receipts in 1985 to terrorism. On the other hand, tourism activity has 
been found to increase when terrorism risk is removed. Referring to the 18-month (August 1994 to February 
1996) cease-fire initiated by the Provisional Irish Republican Army and joined by the Combined Loyalist 
Military Command, O'Neill and Fitz note that: "one of the most manifest 'peace dividends' was the massive 
increase in the level of tourism activity within Northern Ireland in the first year of the joint cease-fires" 
(1996:161). 
 
The inherent logic of the belief that terrorism impacts tourism negatively has been tested by researchers who 
have quantified the relationship—using complex methods and computer models—to ascertain changes in tourist 
activity. The conclusions are consistent: that the potential of risk significantly impacts tourist behavior. The 
influence may begin with the decision-making process (Cook 1990; Sonmez and Graefe 1998). Studies have 
found that tourists modify  their behavior—a type of protective measure—during travel (Hartz 
1989); substitute risky destinations with safer choices (Gu and Martin 1992; Mansfeld 1996); attribute terrorism 
risk to neighboring countries not directly affected (Enders, Sander and Parise 1992); demonstrate a delayed 
reaction to terrorism (Enders and Sandler 1991; Enders, Sandler and Parise 1992); and exhibit cultural 
differences in their reactions to risk (Hurley 1988; Tremblay 1989; Wall 1996). 
 
The impact of terrorism on tourists' decisions has not been investigated extensively, however. The introduction 
of risk into the already complex decision process is likely to further complicate it. In addition, tourism type (i.e., 
leisure or business) can affect the decision process. For instance, business tourists are more restricted in their 
destination and scheduling choices. Cook (1990) and Sonmez and Graefe (1998) investigated decisions 
involving terrorism and political instability risk by using two different populations. According to Cook business 
travelers' propensity for international destinations is predicted by their reluctance to change their plans in 
response to media coverage of terrorism and their level of previous international experience. Cook provided 
subjects with hypothetical situations and imaginary countries in order to understand their reactions to terrorism 
risk. The effectiveness of his method to gauge realistic responses might be questioned, as individual's imagined 
response to a hypothetical terrorist threat cannot represent their actual response to real danger. Similarly, 
Si5nmez and Graefe examined vacation decisions but found past international experience to have only an 
indirect impact on future behavior. Further, results indicated that positive attitudes toward international 
destinations and lower levels of perceived risk increase individuals' propensity for foreign choices and temper 
the need for safety factors in selecting one destination over another. However, it should be noted that during 
their study, no terrorist events were recorded; thus, the relative calm during the research process may be 
reflected in the results. In order to achieve a more concrete under-standing of decisions involving risk, actual 
situational factors need to be included in the research (i.e., current threat, media coverage of terrorism). 
 
As a result of earlier mentioned restrictions, business travelers may face higher risks of being targeted by 
terrorists. In a study of high level business executives of American multinational corporations—who traveled 
abroad extensively despite international terrorism—Hartz (1989) found them modifying their on-trip behavior 
in order to minimize risks. Cognitive and affective coping styles, uses of denial, anxiety, and self-reported 
behavioral changes related to security, were examined through in-depth interviews, which revealed that many 
subjects had experienced danger personally. For example, they reported "near misses" (e.g., missing a flight 
which was later hijacked, leaving a hotel lobby shortly before it was bombed), being victimized in actual 
terrorist events (e.g., hijacking, bombing), or "close calls". Predictably, the majority (83%) reported changing 
behaviors to more secure styles. In addition to this modification, most international business travelers 
experienced restricted freedoms, increased inconvenience, and heightened anxiety levels. Hartz defines secure 
behaviors as keeping a low-profile, dressing down, eliminating conspicuous consumption, and not identifying 
oneself with a large corporation. It might be quite possible for them to adopt these strategies and blend into 
crowds of the host nation; but tourists—while they might be somewhat able to alter their behavior—would be 
seriously challenged in becoming totally inconspicuous because their characteristics (e.g., dress; behavior; 
places visited) would easily delineate them from locals. 
 
The assumption that tourists are rational consumers who move through the decision process by weighing 
utilities against costs suggests that risks associated with increased terrorist incidents at a destination increase the 
perceived cost of the experience. Therefore, terrorist activities at one destination increase tourists' perceived 
risks (and the cost of the experience) which then results in substitution with a destination perceived as safe 
(Enders and Sandler 1991; Enders, Sandler and Parise 1992; Gu and Martin 1992). This concept is sup-ported 
by Gu and Martin's (1992) study which identified destination substitution as a logical solution for international 
tourists who perceive risk. In an effort to explain passenger traffic increase at Orlando International Airport 
(OIA) between 1971 and 1984, they examined passenger arrivals, using secondary data. From the correlation 
between the increase in terrorist hijacking incidents in the Middle East and Europe and increased passenger 
arrivals at OIA, Gu and Martin identified a substitution effect between Orlando and European or Middle Eastern 
destinations. A comparable pattern emerged during the 1991 Persian Gulf War when tourists preferred 
Caribbean and North-American cruises to travel to Europe. Similar but regional changes are discussed in a 
recent study of political instability in the Middle East. Mansfeld (1996) identifies shifts in tourism from the less 
stable "inner ring" of the Middle East (e.g., Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria) to the calmer "outer ring" 
(e.g., Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey) due to Arab—Israeli conflicts in the former situation. Mansfeld states that "a 
country that does not take an active part in conflict is not regarded by potential tourists as a threat" (1995, 
1996:275). He supports his argument by explaining that the outer ring gained visitors the inner ring lost as a 
result of the conflict in the region—which he calls the "spillover effect" (tourism gains by neighbors of 
countries experiencing conflict). In fact, according to Mansfeld, a country's visitor numbers correlate with its 
level of involvement in security situations. Wahab's statement that "when some chain of events deters tourists 
from visiting certain destinations, other destinations, whether proximate or faraway, will benefit" (1996:176) 
supports Mansfeld's (1995, 1996) findings. 
 
While it is difficult to assess such change as a "spillover effect" instead of simple destination substitution, one 
must keep in mind that intra-regional tourists might easily prefer calm destinations neighboring those in 
conflict, unlike inter-regional ones who generalize conflict to entire regions, which might explain the decline in 
tourist interest in Iraq's neighbors during the Gulf War. It might also be wise to consider other situational factors 
at work which might cause travel shifts, such as intensive marketing efforts and currency exchange rates. The 
substitution effect explains why some destinations are preferred over others. The "generalization effect" might 
explain why some tourists who perceive terrorism threat in one country tend to presume entire regions to be 
risky (Enders, Sadler and Parise 1992). The result is the deterrence of tourism from perfectly safe countries 
when their neighbors experience terrorism. This was demonstrated by the decline in overall European travel as a 
result of terrorism in a few countries whose neighbors were experiencing political turmoil. For example, the 
Mediterranean region registered serious decrease in tourism during the 1991 Gulf War in Iraq (other examples 
are discussed later in the paper). 
 
The pervasive nature of print and broadcast media leads one to believe that reports of terrorism would 
immediately deter tourism in affected areas. To the contrary, related research indicates that tourists' reaction to 
terrorism is delayed. In the case of Spain, Enders and Sandler (1991) found that after a typical international 
terrorist occurrence, international visitation dropped by over 140,000—but the decline began three months after 
the incident. This finding is supported by a second study which investigated the effects of terrorism on tourism 
in 12 continental European countries (with special attention to Greece, Italy, and Austria). Enders, Sandler and 
Parise (1992) found tourism to react to terrorist occurrences after a period of 6-9 months. Because these studies 
used secondary data, it is difficult to determine why the reaction was delayed, which leaves room for 
speculation. International tourism is an expensive purchase and tourists may be reluctant (or may be unable) to 
change their plans immediately after a terrorist occurrence. In fact, they may believe that the immediate 
probability of other incidents at the same destination is slim. Another possible explanation might be that 
continuing media coverage after terrorism occurs might exert a strong influence on travel flows. 
 
A final point of interest in the discussion of tourist response to terrorism involves cultural differences in 
reacting to risk. Cross-cultural studies of risk perception have demonstrated differences not only in ranking risks 
but also in the magnitude and source of perceived situations (Goszczynska, Tyszka and Slovic 1991; Mechitov 
and Rebrik 1990; Tiegen, Brun and Slovic 1988). Similarly, international tourists' country of origin was found 
to predict their reaction to terrorist threat (Hurley 1988; Tremblay 1989). In a study comparing the 1985 and 
1986 international arrivals in Rome, Hurley (1988) found a 59% decline in American visitation. The study 
concluded that American tourists were "fickle" and suggested that European hoteliers shift their marketing 
emphases to tourists originating in Europe and Asia. This characterization of Americans as fickle is rather 
unfair when one considers that a significant portion of past terrorist activity specifically targeted US citizens. 
Another study on the effects of terrorism on the tourism receipts of 18 European countries found receipts to 
have different elasticities according to tourists' country of origin (Tremblay 1989). The study attributed its 
findings—that terrorism did not significantly impact receipts from European tourists—to the fact that they may 
be better informed about political events in Europe and are able to control their destinations and timing 
according to regions of high or low terroristic probabilities. Tremblay (1989) accedes that the decline in receipts 
from North American tourists might be because they have often been victimized by terrorist violence and have 
been exposed to more intense media coverage of terrorist events. Echoing Tremblay's argument that tourists 
who are better informed about political events react less severely, Wall (1996) suggests that visitors to Northern 
Ireland who were quite aware of terrorist activity still felt less threatened by it because they understood its 
underlying reasons. In his comparison of Northern Ireland to the Republic of Ireland—with regard to visitors' 
origins and numbers, tourism revenues by country of origin, and main travel purpose—Wall (1996) found that 
Northern Ireland had fewer visitors (than the Republic of Ireland) who spent less money because they came 
mostly to visit friends and relatives. This motivation is also likely to overcome trepidation related to terrorism 
risk, possibly because of a safety-net provided by those individuals. 
 
The studies mentioned above are helpful because they each provide a piece of the puzzle. It is essential to 
understand cognitive and affective processes individuals experience when they feel threatened. Travel, 
especially for leisure, should be an enjoyable experience. When dark elements enter the equation, the 
experience is immediately stripped of any joy only to be replaced by apprehension. Research, particularly when 
secondary data is used, can shed only limited light on these issues. Deep rooted emotions such as fear and the 
need for safety are difficult—if not impossible—to quantify. More creative, perhaps qualitative methods are 
needed to understand why people behave the way they do: However, these studies certainly do provide a 
starting point for much needed future research. 
 
Political Instability and War 
Although circumstances differ significantly, tourism emerges as a political tool in the Philippines, Tibet, and 
The Gambia (Table 1). Using a detailed analysis of the situation in the Philippines, Richter argues that if used 
skillfully, tourism can be an extremely powerful tool. Richter supports her argument with facts gleaned from a 
four-month content analysis of three leading Philippines daily newspapers. President Marcos's 1972 declaration 
of martial law—intended to abrogate his political opposition—established the New Society which promised "a 
reformed and cleansed social order" (1980:237). Marcos successfully managed negative international reaction 
to the undemocratic nature of martial law thereby avoiding damage to the country's economic power. Richter 
credits Marcos's political skill in legitimizing martial law by presenting it as a tenable response to an emergency 
situation involving communist subversion and public violence. Through a series of clever strategies, Marcos 
effectively used tourism to repair the country's political image. Prior to martial law, the Philippines were 
"reputedly seething with subversion and violence" whereas after the declaration of martial law, the country was 
marketed as a safe destination where tourism was a priority industry (1980:242). Because positive publicity 
generated by tourism implied peace and safety, the New Society was credited for making the country safe. 
Richter points out that the country's positive image was more useful to the government than actual tourism 
revenues. By using tourism development as an instrument of foreign and domestic policy, the Philippine 
government bought goodwill with it. In fact, tourist arrivals increased from 144,321 in 1971 to 859,396 in 1978. 
One government official went so far as to declare "Martial Law—Filipino Style" a tourism attraction 
(1980:242). 
 
Tourism also became a political tool in Tibet, but of a different sort. The declaration of martial law in March 
1989, in Lhasa, punctuated the nationalist unrest which began in 1987. Tibet's fledgling tourism industry 
suffered a serious blow as a result of the martial law; however, the most noteworthy effect of the unrest was the 
formation of a secret network of tourists who gathered information on human rights problems in order to carry 
the Tibetans' message to the rest of the world. Schwartz—who spent a total of eight months in Lhasa where he 
collected information as a participant-observer—provides a fascinating and informative "insider's" account of 
the change in the nature of the tourists, which he calls the "politization of the role of traveler" (1991:599). 
During the unrest, journalists were not per-mitted to enter the country and tourists became the only source of 
information about the turmoil in Tibet. Tourists both witnessed and photographed demonstrations in which 
civilians were shot and killed by police. Some foreigners were arrested for taking photographs, their films, 
cameras, and passports were confiscated. According to Schwartz, tourists 
 
...being present alongside Tibetans when the police opened fire in the square in front of the police station 
dramatically changed the relationship between Tibetans and foreigners...foreigners were no longer just 
sight-seers... but international witnesses to "Chinese brutality" and potential political allies (1991:591). 
 
These events clearly demonstrate that the opportunity to witness events in another country—afforded by 
tourism—can be utilized as a political tool involving information gathering and communication of political 
activities on behalf of those trapped and brutalized by it. 
 
Tourism emerges as a political tool from yet another country. Sharpley and Sharpley (1995) examined the 
consequences of a military coup on the Gambia's tourism industry. They allege that by using travel advisories, 
governments of tourism generating countries can influence the flow of tourists in order to wield political power 
over countries dependent on this trade. To support their claim, they cite US travel bans on Cuba and China, as 
well as the US boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. In the case of the Gambia, when the politically stable 
West African country (from 1965-94) experienced a bloodless coup, The Travel Advice Unit of the British 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) issued several subsequent and stringent travel warnings against the 
Gambia. The country's economic and social conditions quickly worsened in a domino effect: British and 
Scandinavian tour operators pulled out, arrivals fell, hotels closed, and tourism related jobs were lost. 
According to the Gambian government, the FC0's travel advice was " ... a political decision aimed at putting 
pressure on the military regime ... ", in effect " ... an unofficial trade embargo" (Sharpley and Sharpley 
1995:173,175). Some-what of a parallel can be drawn between this example and the travel advisory issued 
against Zimbabwe by the US State Department after US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's 1976 visit to 
Zimbabwe (during its 15 year liberation war that lasted from 1965-90). The advisory stated " ... unsettled 
conditions, the potential for increased violence, inability of local government to provide assistance or protection 
... " (Teye 1986:601). Even though the advisory was not intended for neighboring Zambia, it exacerbated the 
already negative impacts of the war on Zambia's tourism. 
 
To avoid hasty and damaging travel advisories, Sharpley and Sharpley (1995) recommend creating an 
independent, international organization to collect, update, and disseminate touristic information in an impartial, 
accurate, and apolitical manner. Some may argue that it is every government's prerogative to issue travel 
advisories against countries it chooses—in response to political or environmental occurrences—to protect its 
own citizens. On the other hand, the formation of the proposed organization (possibly housing an agency within 
the World Tourism Organization) might possibly prevent the exploitation of tourism as a political weapon by 
some countries against others. The literature demonstrates that governments can and do exert political pressure 
through tourism and use it as a promotional vehicle to convey a positive image or as a sanction against others. 
In the unique case of Tibet, tourism enabled the host and guest to share tragic experiences—an opportunity they 
would not have had otherwise—resulting, in the visitors' willingness and ability to assist Tibetans through 
mutual trust. The political force of tourism is evident, but whether it is positive or dangerous appears to hinge 
upon whose hands are controlling it. 
 
Few can deny the truism that peace, calm and safety are requisite to attract tourists to any destination. In fact, a 
country's prospects of developing a strong tourism industry remain dismal in the absence of political stability 
(Teye 1988). Whether public attention converges on a country's political troubles briefly or indefinitely, its 
industry is bound to suffer. Referring to political problems, Scott effectively stressed the potential for long-term 
damage: " ... whereas a natural disaster creates havoc and passes, a political crisis may last for days, months, or 
even years", totally destroying the fragile concept of image for a developing tourism industry (1988:58). This 
statement is especially true for occurrences that receive global media coverage and was aptly demonstrated by 
China's 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. The entire world witnessed government brutality against pro-
democracy student protesters—thanks to up-to-the-minute news coverage by major networks. The negative 
images of China translated into declining hotel occupancy rates and lost tourism revenues. China's eager efforts 
to attract international visitors came to a screeching halt for several years. Although a 55% increase in foreign 
visitation was recorded in 1991 and 48% in 1992, the memory remains (Hall and O'Sullivan 1996). The 
televised images may have lasted for a brief time but their impact was very powerful. 
 
The concept of image appears to extend as much beyond spatial boundaries as time boundaries. The 
"generalization effect" referred to earlier in the context of terrorism (Enders, Sandler and Parise 1992) is also 
applicable to political problems and war. The 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 1991-96 Bosnia-Herzegovina War 
were confined to very specific geographic areas. Still, these wars symbolized political unrest for their entire 
regions. During the Persian Gulf War, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates experienced 
a sharp drop in tourist arrivals even though they were not all equally affected (Hollier 1991; WTO 1991). The 
US tourism industry experienced serious problems in business as well as inbound-outbound international 
tourism (US House of Representatives 1991; WTO 1991). The threat of terrorism and political unrest in the 
Middle East triggered a massive realignment of international travel flows during Operation Desert Storm due to 
the threats and expectations of related terrorism (Abu Fadil 1992; Hollier 1991). 
 
The war in the Balkans (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina) quickly halted Yugoslavia's tourism activity. 
When the Yugoslav army attacked Slovenia in June 1991 (even though the war in Slovenia lasted 10 days 
before moving to Croatia in 1991 and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992), specialized tour operators for Yugoslavia 
lost over one million booked tourists according to Mihalies study. Even after a period of two years, " ... figures 
for Slovenian tourism were still far behind the pre-war figures" (1996:237). The author attributes this to several 
factors: public confusion of Slovenia with Slavonia (area in Croatia); lack of knowledge about either Slovenia 
or the country's political situation; and the proximity of Slovenia to the ongoing war (at the time of the study) in 
former Yugoslavia. Understandably, Slovenia's recovery from the Balkan war has been much slower than 
China's tourism rebound. The explanation may be the profuse and graphic media coverage of the war for its 
duration. Images of the atrocities against the Bosnians left indelible scars on the collective psyche. Slovenia 
may be as safe and calm as any peaceful country; however, the images associated with her neighbors can linger 
long after the war has ended. 
 
The effect of Zimbabwe's war on Zambia's tourism industry is another demonstration of the generalization of 
risk to unaffected areas. After examining the effects of Zimbabwe's 1965 Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence, Teye attributes Zambia's plummeting tourism to Zimbabwe's armed conflict. The sharp decline is 
also ascribed to a long list of detrimental factors: kidnapping of and firing upon tourists; negative publicity; 
perceptions of high crime levels, systematic targeting of tourism infrastructure; restrictions of tourist activities; 
absence of night life due to dawn-to-dusk curfews; blackouts imposed on tourists' main entry and exit points; 
military roadblocks; occupation of certain areas by guerilla groups; and total bans on photography (Teye 1986). 
Tourist arrivals to neighboring Zambia dropped drastically (the country was unable to record arrivals between 
1967 and 1969) which in turn caused ground operators to withdraw tourism services. Not only was Zambia's 
industry sabotaged by the conflict, but serious organizational and management problems also ensued—such as 
protecting tourists who remained in the area during the conflict (Teye 1986). 
 
Regardless of whether risks are real or perceived, Teye's (1986) study clearly shows that the impact of political 
conflict reverberates to its surroundings and this ripple effect extends to multiple tourism interests over what 
could be a lengthy period of time. Following his examination of the impacts of coups d'etat on African tourism 
development in general and Ghana's in particular, Teye (1988) concludes that tourism activity halts in the short 
term when travel agents stop suggesting the destination to potential tourists, when border closures intended to 
prevent tourism activity both to and from the country are implemented, and when the delivery of tourism 
services is suspended or canceled. Teye also argues that overall tourism development suffers in the long term 
when a country's image is damaged (by negative media coverage and travel advisories) and when foreign 
investors lose interest in the country experiencing political upheavals. It appears that a variety of political 
problems have comparable impacts on tourism: destination image is damaged, visitation suffers, revenues are 
lost, and development plans are shelved. 
 
An intriguing study by Pitts (1996) diverts attention to a chameleon-like quality of tourism. After interviewing 
numerous tourism constituents—regarding the effects of the 1994 armed rebellion against the Mexican 
government—Pitts notes sharp declines in domestic and international visitation. A new tourist type was 
detected in San Cristobal, whom Pitts refers to as "conflict or war tourists". These tourists were interested in 
becoming a part of the action and in seeing what was happening. They also transformed Chiapas from an ethnic 
tourism product to one offering the experience of conflict and "thrill of political violence" (1996:224). A second 
group of tourists appeared in the form of journalists, researchers, and human rights activists. Pitts (1996:226) 
underscores an interesting change in tourist perceptions in stating that "many travelers were more afraid of the 
Mexican military and their checkpoints than they were of the Zapatista insurgents" during the first six months of 
the uprising (1996:226). 
 
Perhaps a destination's social, cultural and environmental characteristics are stronger determinants of how 
tourism is affected than the type of political conflict (i.e., military coup, armed rebellion and regional war). 
Such distinctions make it difficult to codify impacts into an inventory in order to devise solutions. Each 
destination faces different challenges in the effort to overcome a negative image, declining tourism and lost 
revenues. Solutions for one country may not prove effective for another; however, strategies to recover from 
tourism crises that are triggered by political problems or terrorism still need to be identified. 
 
The multidimensionality of the war and tourism relationship becomes apparent only after careful consideration. 
The breadth of the relationship is imaginatively communicated by Diller and Scofidio: 
Tourism and war appear to be polar extremes of cultural activity—the paradigm of international accord 
at one end and discord at the other. The two practices, however, often intersect: tourism of war, war on 
tourism, tourism as war, war targeting tourism, tourism under war, war as tourism arc but a few of their 
interesting couplings (quoted in Smith 1996:249). 
 
Several of the above couplings (e.g., tourism under war, tourism of war, war as tourism etc.) deserve mention. 
First and most obviously, war is a negative influence on tourism demand (tourism under war) and diverts tourist 
flows to safer regions (Bar-On 1996; Hall and O'Sullivan 1996; Mansfeld 1995, 1996; Mihalie' 1996; Richter 
1980; Teye 1986, 1988). This can be viewed positively or negatively, depending on the country's position—
since safer countries (not involved or less involved in hostilities)—might gain visitors lost by the more 
dangerous destinations (Mansfeld 1995, 1996). A second dimension of the war-tourism relationship involves 
the creation of a new kind of tourist, attracted by the conflict (tourism of war) (Mihali'6 1996; Pitts 1996; 
Wahab 1995). For example, some tourists wanted to see the results or consequences of the war in Croatia and 
Bosnia (Mihalie' 1996; Wahab 1995) while others wanted to witness armed rebellion in Mexico (Pitts 1996). 
Wahab (1995:90) describes these "war spotters" as risk takers in search of excitement. Other types drawn to a 
warring region include members of the media, human rights activists, and refugees (war tourists) (Pitts 1996). 
 
A third dimension of the relationship involves the transformation of the memory of war into a sentimental 
tourism attraction (war as tourism). Smith explains the strange link between tourism and war by comparing the 
two as " ... social processes that are inseparable from the underlying and diverse cultural threads of group 
values, sanctions, beliefs and behaviors" (1996:250). The violence of war is believed to differ from that of 
terrorism or crime, according to Smith (1976) "because of its penetrating societal involvement" and also 
because terrorist or criminal violence usually ends quickly and without leaving a "heritage to become permanent 
tourist markers". She suggests that war gives special meaning and memory to places and events that link 
warfare to tourism and adds " ... despite the honors of death and destruction (and also because of them), the 
memorabilia of warfare and allied products (such as the houses where 'George Washington slept here') probably 
constitutes the largest single category of tourist attractions in the world" (1996:248). Examples include 
battlefields (e.g., Civil War, WWII); cemeteries (e.g., Arlington); memorials/ monuments for soldiers (e.g., 
Vietnam Memorial); flames for the fallen, museums for medals, historical re-enactments and military museums. 
According to Mihalie", when a war ends "it becomes part of the historical memory of a certain destination and 
this memory becomes a tourist attraction"; the recent emergence of Vietnam as a tourist destination is a 
testimony to this statement. Similarly, when war destroys famous tourist attractions (e.g., destruction of 
Dubrovnik, a famous destination of the former Yugoslavia), media attention and tourist interest intensify 
(1996:234-235). 
 
Whether a country is experiencing war, political unrest, terrorism, or heavy crime, its tourism industry is bound 
to pay a heavy toll— regardless of the abundance of scenic or cultural attractions. Even normally secure 
destinations can suffer when security is threatened (Richter 1980). Destinations with erratic politics or histories 
of ethnic or socioeconomic troubles have little hope of developing strong and successful tourism; the same can 
be said for countries with neighbors in turmoil (Bar-On 1996; Hall and O'Sullivan 1996; Richter 1980; Teye 
1986, 1988). 
 
The Media's Role, Destination Image, and Crisis Management 
Despite global political threats, the recent history of international tourism indicates that this phenomenon will 
be an enduring human activity. Since there is little reason to doubt that political conflicts and terrorism will also 
continue at some level, the importance of developing strategies for managing the relationship becomes evident. 
The effects of political disruption and violence on the industry need to be regarded as a crisis in need of 
management. Obviously, tourism is quite adept at utilizing proven marketing principles. When it suffers a 
serious setback due to negative occurrences, however, it can no longer rely on traditional marketing efforts. The 
industry must con-duct "recovery marketing"—or marketing integrated fully with crisis management activities. 
Destination image—a recurring reference in this paper—in particular, is one aspect of tourism which demands 
crisis management and recovery marketing, because it is often the first casualty of violence. 
Image has been described as "simplified impressions" (Mayo 1973), "total impression an entity makes on the 
minds of others" (Dichter 1985:75), and "the sum of beliefs, impressions, ideas, and perceptions that people 
hold of objects, behaviors, and events" (Crompton 1979). Images are believed to develop on two levels: organic 
(formed internally as a result of actual experience or visitation) and induced (formed from externally received 
and processed information such as from advertisements, publicity, news reports, or input from acquaintances) 
(Gartner 1989; Gunn 1972). Media coverage of terrorism or political upheaval has the potential to shape the 
induced image individuals have of destinations. The media's power to actually change preexisting attitudes is 
somewhat questioned, but Weimann and Winn defend its ability to impact attitudes that have not been fully 
formed. They state: 
 
Media coverage of terrorist events has an especially powerful potential influence because media 
coverage is frequently the only source of information on an issue available to the audience. Media 
coverage is not only frequently a unique source of information but it may also be a unique source of 
interpretation. In particular, the general public is apt to rely to an enormous degree on media accounts 
for an understanding of terrorists' motives, the implications of their actions, and the essential character 
of the situation (1994:154). 
 
This statement refers to attitudes about terrorists and their aims but can also be applied to attitudes about 
destinations, on which the public is not well informed. Negative media coverage can impact attitude formation 
quite easily. Because of the intangible nature of the tourism experience, destinations depend heavily on positive 
images. As a result, the image becomes a crucial factor in travel choice and tourism marketing (Bramwell and 
Rawding 1996; Chon 1991; Dann 1996; Echtner and Ritchie 1991; Gartner 1993). During decision-making, 
potential tourists compare destinations according to perceived costs and benefits (Crompton 1992; Enders and 
Sandler 1991; Enders, Sandler and Parise 1992; van Raaij and Francken 1984; Woodside and Lysonski 1989). 
Some destination alternatives may be eliminated as a result of their potential costs (or perceived risks), 
especially if associated with media images of terrorist threat or political turmoil. Even though the importance of 
image to marketing is well known, the impact of terrorism or political violence on destination image (Witt and 
Moore 1992) and the link between it and mass media (Butler 1990; Ehemann 1977) have received scant 
research attention. 
 
In a study of negative image caused by civil unrest and terrorism, Witt and Moore investigated whether 
promoting special events created enough tourism interest to outweigh Northern Ireland's negative external 
image. They articulate the need for more attention to "overcome negative images of a destination caused by 
terrorism" (1992:64). But instead of solutions to overcome negative images, the authors suggest strategies for 
increasing visitation (i.e., developing new tourism products to divert attention). Even though they are quick to 
add that staging special events alone is not enough, they simply advise that such efforts must be supported with 
heavy promotions. Butler (1990) discusses the influence of three types of media (oral, literary, visual) on image 
formation from a historical perspective but does not delve into the effects of mass media on destination image. 
An earlier study examined print media coverage of events in the Republic of Ireland by focusing on vocabulary 
use (Ehemann 1977). The author cites Brookfield's (1969) classification of individuals' perceived environment 
by types of information they receive: daily experience (clear and accurate); shadow zone (occasional or 
secondary experience beyond individual's immediate domain); and outer field (dependent on secondary 
information sources). Accordingly, negative media coverage of a destination can contribute to the "outer field" 
of potential travelers' perceived environment. Ehemann (1977) objects to value-laden statements (i.e., "Ireland 
is a turbulent country") used by print media which can convey a value judgment about a destination and which 
can potentially contribute to a negative evaluation of that destination. Ehemann's statement "behavior is geared 
to the perceived world, however distorted it may be" (1977:28) alludes to the power of mass media over public 
perception and the fact that perceptions represent reality for most individuals. A brief example provides this 
assertion with credibility: in 1985, 28 million Americans went abroad and 162 were either killed or injured in 
terrorist activities, indicating a probability of less than 0.00057% of becoming a victim of terrorism. Despite the 
low probability, 1.8 million Americans changed their foreign travel plans in 1986 due to the previous year's 
terrorist events which equals about 6.43% of the previous year's over-seas travel volume. 
In their examination of the mutual reliance between mass media and terrorists, Weimann and Winn (1994) 
underscore the impact of mass media on public perceptions. An extensive and insightful analysis of three 
separate terrorism-related data sets (chronology of terrorist events between 1968 and 1986 developed by the 
RAND Corporation; news coverage of ABC, CBS, and NBC television networks from the Vanderbilt Archives; 
terrorism—related content from nine inter-national newspapers of the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Egypt, and Pakistan) leads Weimann and Winn to conclude that a symbiotic 
relationship exists between terrorists and journalists. Their book, The Theater of Terror: Mass Media and 
International Terrorism (1994), posits that terrorism is both a symbolic event and a performance that is staged 
for the benefit of media attention. Karber's (1971) description of terrorism as communication takes on new 
meaning in light of Weimann and Winn's description of terrorism as a media event. Broadcast media (especially 
television) provides the perfect stage for the riveting performance of terrorist incidents. Oddly and despite 
different motives, the media and terrorists converge to aid each other in the effort to communicate with the 
audience; the media achieves higher ratings and terrorists achieve their goal of publicity. Frederick Hacker 
(behavioral expert and Austrian-American psychiatrist) succinctly describes this relationship: 
 
The mass media willingly or unwittingly are the spokesmen of the terrorists, the transmitters of the 
terroristic message, the instrument through which terroristic deeds with all their excitement, drama and 
significance become known to a world audience (quoted in Weimann and Winn 1994:111). 
 
This way, 
 
By capturing the media agenda for days or weeks, such groups can hope to (a) increase their profile and 
amplify their message; (b) enhance their relative moral legitimacy; and (c) improve their organizational 
effectiveness (Weimann and Winn 1994:143). 
 
While simply achieving media coverage might be satisfying to international terrorists seeking such attention, 
their level of satisfaction depends on tangible benefits resulting from the coverage (i.e., increasing public 
recognition, dominating competing terrorist groups, moving closer to political objectives) (1994:173). 
Considering terrorist motives to disrupt tourism, media coverage of violence involving tourists is likely to be 
extremely gratifying to terrorist groups. Continuing their examination of the bizarre and mutually dependent 
nature of the terrorist-media relationship, Weimann and Winn discuss factors that predict media coverage of a 
terrorist incident. Events become televised if 13 conditions (determined significant by Galtung and Ruge 1965) 
are satisfied: the frequency of events must be compatible with the frequency of news production (the intensity, 
short duration, and fast-pace of terrorist events are naturally preferred to events which unfold slowly); the 
terrorist event easily surpasses a threshold of emotional significance necessary for an event to be televised; the 
act itself is clear, unambiguous, and easy to report; the incident is often meaningful within the audience's 
cultural framework (especially when international tourists are involved) and is readily broadcast; the event is 
relevant to most nations around the world; and it is usually unexpected and embodies the element of surprise. 
Judging from these conditions, among others, terrorism appears to be an ideal subject for broadcasting; in turn, 
the broadcast media gives terrorists the ultimate instrument with which to voice themselves. A statement by 
Gerry Adams, president of Sinn Fein (IRA's political wing) seems to say it all: 
 
The tactics of armed struggle is of primary importance because it provides a vital cutting-edge. Without 
it the issue of Ireland would never even be an issue. So, in effect the armed struggle becomes armed 
propaganda (Weimann and Winn 1994:59). 
 
The mutual benefits of their relationship to the media and terrorists are clear. What seems to be missing, 
however, is the social responsibility of media members in their decisions to cater to the wishes of terrorist 
organizations in turn for higher ratings. Another and far more provocative explanation of media coverage of 
terrorism is attributed to Chomsky and Hermann: 
... mass media attention devoted to [nonstate] "terrorism" is greatly over-blown and that this 
misrepresentation of reality reflects United States propaganda strategy for distracting the public from the 
"real terrorism", the organized purposeful violence practiced by the United States and its Third World 
allies (quoted in Weimann and Winn 1994:240). 
 
This critical view that Western countries highlight certain types of terrorism (i.e., by anti-Western terrorist 
organizations) to divert attention away from state-sponsored terrorism, is indeed troubling. Regardless of the 
motives, the time and attention afforded to terrorists clearly benefit both their organizations and the media. The 
losers include society as well as those destinations which suffer as a result of the negative images such coverage 
spawns. 
 
Protection from the ramifications of terrorism can occur on different planes. Individual tourists can access 
safety tips from various sources. Popular travel magazines and various other periodicals expound on the dangers 
of international travel detailing preventive or cautionary measures concerning terrorism, political turmoil, as 
well as health issues (Chandler 1991; Englander 1991; Fedarko 1993; Fletcher 1993; Hagerty 1993; Norton 
1991; Reeves 1987; The Economist 1986a, b, 1990). International tourists are warned against dangers of 
different destinations by books (Felton and Aral 1995) and periodic, up-to-date governmental travel advisories 
alerting individuals to actual and potential global security issues (currently accessible directly from the US 
Department of State website on the Internet). There are also articles focusing on travel security issues in 
academic journals (Lehrman 1986; Ryan 1993; Skolnik 1991). 
 
Based on the availability and the applicability of information, tourists are pretty much on their own; individuals 
must make their own decisions and proceed accordingly. Several protective strategies are offered to those who 
decide to travel despite risks. D'Amore and Anuza (1986) were among the first to suggest crisis management for 
international tourists. For example, they are advised to avoid displays of wealth, keep a low profile, vary daily 
routines during lengthy business trips, and fly economy (since hijackers are known to prefer first class to 
establish their temporary headquarters). If the potential costs of the trip appear to outweigh the benefits, the 
tourists can decide to stay home. Unfortunately, for destinations plagued with terrorism or political turmoil, the 
solution is not as simple. Especially if their economic stability depends on tourism, they have little choice but to 
deal with the issue as a crisis badly in need of management. If terrorism can be viewed as a crisis by the 
industry, its energy and interest can be effectively channeled into managing it. While the need for tourism crisis 
management is obvious, few have addressed the issue (Sonmez, Backman and Allen 1994; Wahab 1996; 
Waugh 1990). To clarify, a crisis is " ... any event which creates negative publicity and the period of time after 
a disaster occurrence which lasts until full recovery is achieved and pre-disaster conditions resume"; whereas a 
disaster is " ... an event that abruptly causes loss of life, human suffering, public and private property damage, 
economic and social disruption" (Sonmez, Backman and Allen 1994:2.1). Then, a tourism crisis is: 
 
... any occurrence which can threaten the normal operation and conduct of tourism related businesses; 
damage a tourist destination's overall reputation for safety, attractiveness, and comfort by negatively 
affecting visitors' perceptions of that destination; and, in turn, cause a downturn in the local travel and 
tourism economy, and interrupt the continuity of business operations for the local travel and tourism 
industry, by the reduction in tourist arrivals and expenditures. (Sonmez, Backman and Allen 1994:2.2) 
 
It can be inferred then that crisis situations which threaten tourist activity, often begin with short-lived disasters, 
whether natural or human-caused. Thus, a single terrorist incident (viewed initially as a disaster) or repeated 
attacks can create a crisis situation if that destination's image of safety is significantly damaged (i.e., Egypt, 
Peru, and Spain) (Wahab 1996). The destination must not only manage the crisis but also initiate marketing 
efforts to recover lost tourism by rebuilding its positive image. 
 
Tourism crises triggered by terrorism are likely to be different from those caused by natural disasters; however, 
recommendations for managing general tourism crises are in order. It is recommended to first organize a task 
force (prior to any negative occurrence) to deal expressly with crisis situations, one which efficiently delegates 
to teams the responsibilities of communicating with the media, public relations, information coordination, fund 
raising, and marketing and advertising. It is further suggested to initiate crisis management activities with the 
proper identification of a situation as a crisis. Once the "crisis mind-set" is in place, the gravity of the situation 
is likely to assure discipline and dedication until full recovery is achieved. Other recommendations include 
organizing press conferences, developing a strong relationship with media members to assure balance and 
accurate coverage, and developing press kits for media distribution (Sonmez, Backman and Allen 1994). These 
recommendations actually direct crisis managers to implement recovery marketing, of which the central motive 
is to repair the destination's ruined image. 
 
Drawing from Egypt's retaliation to terrorism (Table 1), Wahab describes possible actions for managing a 
tourism crisis that hinge on security and promotion. Egyptian police adopted preventive and proactive measures 
that eventually helped them find and arrest terrorist leaders. After terrorists targeted international tourists, the 
country's police force 
 
...adopted counter-measures against terrorism that were heavily based upon tight anti-criminal actions 
aiming at protecting the country at large and the vulnerable tourist industry in particular... every bus, 
train, and Nile cruiser transporting tourists has a "discreet" police guard (1996:181). 
 
Another facet of Egyptian crisis management involved aggressive promotions. The ministry re-evaluated its 
existent marketing strategy prior to setting new objectives which included heavy advertising. In support of the 
ministry's measures, Wahab states, 
 
... the only way to overcome such poor image (resulting from sustained terrorism) projection is by 
vigorous promotions that can provide wide exposure sufficient to capture the international media's 
attention (1996: 195). 
 
To create positive publicity, Egypt hosted a sequence of international special events to draw world and industry 
attention away from the terrorism. Recognizing that promotion alone is insufficient, Wahab (1996) also 
recommends maintaining good contacts with members of the international media; providing comprehensive 
information to international tour operators, travel agents, and the press (to evaluate travel risks in their proper 
context); and wisely guiding tourists away from high risk areas. Elsewhere, once the conflict in Chiapas, 
Mexico (Table 1) had ended, aggressive recovery efforts were exerted by the new tourism minister. All 
activities converged on efforts to increase domestic tourism by re-establishing confidence in Chiapas. One 
million letters were sent to businesses in Mexico entreating them to hold their meetings and conferences in the 
city's new convention centers. As incentives, businesses were offered tax breaks for using Chiapas hotels, and 
hotel prices were lowered to more competitive levels. In addition to these, Pitts (1996) suggests producing and 
distributing videos of other destinations that suffered a similar fate, demonstrating their return of peace and 
stability, and developing slogans to the same effect to aid recovery efforts. 
 
Terrorism is obviously more than a violent fad which can be expected to cease anytime soon. But few nations 
around the world afflicted with terrorism or political turmoil can afford to give up their tourism earnings. 
Instead, they need to search for strategies to cope with negative occurrences. Understanding the relationship 
between terrorism and tourism may be among the first steps. It may be difficult—even impossible—to fully 
control terrorism, but nations cannot ignore the problem either. In fact, both the government and the tourism 
industry need to focus on this threat in order to assess risks to international tourists and strategize for effective 
crisis marketing (Hall and O'Sullivan 1996). Most crises are difficult to prevent, due to their unpredictable 
nature—especially those resulting from terrorism or political problems. Furthermore, each crisis situation is 
different and difficult to resolve with simple formulas. Destinations need to prepare a plan of action specific to 
their needs. Having such a blueprint merely promises to save valuable time, energy, and other resources when a 
destination is faced with a crisis. In light of societal and global complexities, no destination is immune to 
negative occurrences; thus adhering to an "it can't happen to us" philosophy is naive, if not reckless. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Even a cursory review of events during the past 25 years is enough to demonstrate that terrorism will not 
suddenly vanish—a view more indicative of realism than pessimism. Accepting the permanence of terrorism 
and regional political problems is a requisite to managing them. This is pertinent not only for governments of 
countries afflicted by terrorism or political disturbances and those generating tourism, but also for the 
international tourism industry itself. When the industry experiences negative events caused by natural disasters, 
greater public and industry understanding and tolerance are invoked. But human caused events, especially those 
involving political violence, trigger public outrage or intimidation. Although the problem at hand is 
exceptionally complex, the hope for effective and applicable solutions lies in additional research and 
cooperative efforts of industry practitioners, government agencies, and academic institutions. 
 
This article has attempted to provide a background on the theme of terrorism and political instability in the 
context of tourism for those interested in developing it through investigation. A considerable and largely 
cohesive body of literature emerges from the contributions of scholars from different disciplines (Table 2). This 
should serve as the foundation on which future studies are built, rather than models for duplication. For 
example, studies focusing primarily on arrivals, expenditures, and re-alignment of travel flows are useful, but 
too many of them do little more than support each other in the conclusion that terrorism results in economic 
loss. Aside from negligible differences, researchers unanimously agree in principle that political violence in any 
form is detrimental to destination image and, as a result, to tourist flows. Since this has been established, 
researchers need to explore possible solutions and preventive measures to deal with terrorism. Although many 
studies cited in this paper advocate the necessity of crisis management efforts, few have taken up the challenge. 
This may be attributed to the enormity of the task and the intimidating nature of managing a crisis evolving 
from terrorism and one which includes restoring a destination's image. Despite useful studies focusing on the 
topic, the need for additional research is both urgent and clear. Several possible topics for future studies are 
suggested below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
New case studies of destinations that have experienced terrorism, political strife or regional war can be 
extremely beneficial in determining effective and ineffective management and recovery efforts. Others' 
experiences, successes, and failures can be an invaluable source of information for tourism officials and 
managers who need realistic solutions for handling similar crises. Unquestionably, the industry needs a set of 
comprehensive terrorism crisis management guidelines. It might be feasible to compile an inventory of effective 
crisis management and recovery marketing solutions by examining (from case studies) other destinations' 
efforts (especially when the case is tracked through full recovery). As needed, solutions can be tailored to 
correspond with other destinations' particular needs and circumstances. Additional research is also needed to 
better under-stand how political violence influences destination image, how mass media contributes to the 
development of destination image, and how image can be repaired after a negative occurrence, especially when 
accompanied by media scrutiny. Even though a wide body of literature exists on destination image, little 
attention has been paid to such topics. Another concern, albeit more difficult to respond to, is how to mitigate 
media exploitation of terrorist incidents, especially when a country's tourism image and possibly its subsequent 
economic viability as a destination are at stake. 
 
The element of risk as a component of tourist decisions has received limited attention (Cook and Fesenmaier 
1992; Um and Crompton 1992; Sonmez and Graefe 1996, 1997. Potential tourists are often exposed to media 
coverage of international political violence. The volatile relationship between tourism and terrorism is 
magnified by the media in a manner to cloud actual probabilities of being targeted by terrorists. As a result, 
perceived risk may outweigh reality in forming attitudes toward destinations. Travel risk should be studied in 
terms of real and perceived risk and in relation to destination image and tourists attitudes, because it is crucial 
for destination marketers to understand perceptions and attitudes in order to devise promotional strategies to 
address concerns and to alter negative and reinforce positive perceptions. 
 
Finally, the feasibility and logistics of creating an independent and international organization to disseminate 
impartial travel information (as suggested by Sharpley and Sharpley 1995) should be investigated. The 
formation of such an entity may actually preclude serious damage to the tourism industry of a destination 
unaffected by political violence but declared dangerous by other countries (either intentionally, for political 
reasons or carelessly, as an over-reaction). Additional relevant and timely topics are likely to emerge from 
future studies. The responsibility of dealing with terrorism and its impacts on the tourism industry is shared by 
governments, journalists, and international organizations. It might be overly idealistic to attempt to influence 
their agendas; however, it is quite reasonable to expect realistic solutions to a serious problem, which could 
threaten the future of peaceful travel, from the academic community of tourism researchers.  
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